COLUMBUS REPUBLIC(IN)
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Changes at CIA detailed in former director's talk

By JEFF HERMAN
The Republic Staff Writer

Stansfield Turner, CIA director under President Carter, said Tuesday intelligence gathering has undergone "revolutions" in accountability and technology during the last decade.

Turner was the first speaker in this year's Columbus Distinguished Visitors Series. He told a group of about 150 Columbus area residents at Columbus East High School Tuesday night reports critical of the CIA in the 1970s caused the agency to abandon covert operations and caused Congress to become a watchdog for the agency.

Turner took the helm of the agency in 1979 and found the agency had dropped all covert activities. "The CIA was hunkering down. They laid low."

Executive orders established two congressional committees to oversee the CIA and its covert activities. Turner explained this was a drastic change compared to intelligence practices from after World War II to the mid and late 70s.

"You can't have good intelligence without having good accountability." He said that by the end of 1979 he had proven to the intelligence community the CIA could operate with the oversight committees.

Another revolution in intelligence over the 30-year period was in the area of technology.

Turner said CIA agents gathered all the intelligence information in the past, but over the years, satellites and other listening equipment has reduced the risk to human life involved in intelligence gathering.

"The rules of intelligence have been altered in the last decade because of a revolution in technology. There are lots of things satellites can't see and electronic systems cannot hear." Turner said the electronic equipment can't pick up the information unless someone knows where to point it and what to listen for.

Turner said the human agents exist now to verify information gathered by the electonic systems and to probe beyond information already available.

Most people have the idea CIA agents are James Bond-types, Turner said, but that isn't true. He said technology is playing a greater role in getting the information, but he joked, "I've never been trapped in a Swiss chalet with a beautiful blonde."

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U.S. Spying Held Unhurt by West German Breach

By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 7 — Reagan Administration officials have concluded that recent disclosures of West Germans spying for East Germany are very costly to West German intelligence operations but will not seriously hurt American intelligence activities.

At the same time, the officials acknowledged that the exposures gave an accurate and unsettling look into the amount of Soviet espionage in Western Europe and raised embarrassing questions about sharing information with allies, questions the Administration would sooner not have to answer.

The officials said the Central Intelligence Agency had always assumed that West Germany, more so than other Western European countries, was significantly infiltrated by East German and Soviet agents.

Accordingly, the officials maintained that American intelligence shared with Bonn was given in pieces that did not include information about American agents and their sources and methods.

Same for Most Allies

The same practice, also followed by past Administrations, applies to every Western ally to some degree, the officials said.

"A calculated risk" is what Stansfield Turner, a retired admiral and Director of Central Intelligence from 1977 to 1981, called the sharing of information on intelligence, the military and technology.

Administration after administration has decided that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization could not endure without taking that risk, and that the benefits of sharing outweigh the consequences of some secrets reaching Moscow.

"It is a kind of game we play within the alliance and within our own Government," said a high-ranking Administration official. "We are routinely careful about what we share because we know there's a serious problem in NATO, but mostly we don't think about it because we have no choice but to share."

'We Did Worry'

Admiral Turner acknowledged that during his tenure in the Carter Administration, "We did worry from time to time, but not as much as we should have."

In any event, Reagan Administration officials were quick to stress that the greatest damage to American intelligence operations has been done by Americans who spied for Moscow. "We're in no position to throw stones," an intelligence official said.

Almost all of the former and present officials interviewed said Moscow had done far better than the West in placing agents. But Admiral Turner and others noted that it was easier to spy in the West because the societies are open.

But the officials found it difficult to gauge the net effects of the gap in human, as opposed to technical, spying in general or the effects of the latest spy scandals in West Germany, except to say that Moscow had gained advantages. But they said these had not proved decisive in any area.

Concerned About Government

For now, Reagan Administration officials say they are far more worried about the fate of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Government than the disruption caused by the defection to East Germany of a high-ranking West German intelligence official.

"The biggest question for us," a State Department official said, "is whether the Kohl Government will go down the tubes, since we don't like any of the alternatives, left or right."

The view here is that Mr. Kohl and his subordinates were particularly clumsy in managing their intelligence operations, resulting in the public exposure of alliance problems.

The latest spy scandal started to unfold two weeks ago with the reported defection to East Germany of Hans Joachim Tiedge, Bonn's counterespionage chief watching for East German agents. Mr. Tiedge was allowed to stay in his post for several years apparently despite drinking and debt problems.

About the same time, it was revealed that a secretary to the President of West Germany and a secretary to the Economics Minister were also implicated as spies for East Germany. According to Administration intelligence sources, the involvement of the secretaries brought to light a standing American concern that Bonn does not routinely do full background checks before giving security clearances.

Looking at Special Problems

The officials said it had also caused them to pay attention once again to the special problems of sharing information with West Germany. For one, it is part of a divided country, where people can move back and forth and be readily integrated into West German life. For another, Bonn's various intelligence agencies are considered here to be particularly weak and politicized by ties of individual civil servants to political parties, and marked by a good deal of bureaucratic feuding.

The feuding and politicking is not unique to Bonn, but combined with the movement between the two Germanys, it has led American intelligence officials over the years to exercise extra care in sharing information with Bonn.

These officials say the most sharing of American intelligence is done with Britain. Then, with a considerable drop, with France and West Germany, then less again with the smaller Western European countries. The officials said that from time to time, Bonn's intelligence chiefs had complained about not getting enough information, but to little avail.

The American officials also pointed out that one of the most serious breaches of Western intelligence occured with the British several years ago. London caught up with one of its citizens in Moscow's employ who had been regularly turning over highly sensitive communications data.

Assessment of Damage

The assessment here of the possible damage by Mr. Tiedge is that he was probably able to shield several East German agents from Bonn's detection, and that even though he was not responsible for Bonn's operations in East Germany, he probably knew much about them.

Therefore officials here assume that most of Bonn's agents have had to be called in for their own protection.

"We never relied on them very much anyway," an Administration intelligence official said.

White House officials insisted that American agents in Eastern Europe were in no increased danger and were staying on the job.

Potentially Costly Data

The information that may have been turned over to East Germany by the secretary to Bonn's President might be more costly to the West as a whole, the sources said. She worked in the foreign affairs section and routinely had access to sensitive telegrams and memorandums of conversations with senior Western and American leaders. This political intelligence could have given Moscow the edge in propaganda battles and at the negotiating table.

Perhaps more worrisome still to officials here was the information that the secretary to the Economics Minister might have passed along. In Bonn, that ministry is in charge of sensitive technology, and the secretary probably had regular access to such data.

Administration officials said technology-sharing with Bonn was extensive and sophisticated. They added that they believed these arrangements, including plans to share technology with Bonn on President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, would not be affected by the spying disclosures.

The officials noted that American administrations had always cooperated with Bonn extensively on military planning, both bilaterally and through the joint NATO commands and committees. The working assumption of the United States Government over the years has been that much of this is siphoned off to Moscow through agents in the alliance.

But the officials said they thought the damage was limited by the sheer number and levels of plans and contingencies and by the fact that real military decisions are made as the situation un-

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STANSFIELD TURNER
Guest columnist

The spy-temptress as poll-taker

McLEAN, Va. — One of the key intelligence issues is the right balance between human espionage and that done by the new technical systems such as photographic satellites and electronic listening systems.

The CIA's espionage branch is still a bit stunned by the new reliance on technical systems that can collect data without exposing the life of an agent and that can respond very quickly. In response, advocates of human spying commonly say that what technical systems cannot do, but human espionage can, is to discern other people's plans or intentions.

Uncovering intentions is, indeed, the strong point of human espionage, but reading another country's messages through electronic intercepts or listening to its leaders talk to each other through a concealed microphone can reveal intentions even more reliably.

Human spying has the advantage, though, of allowing us to recruit an agent who has access to exactly the people making decisions — that is, if we can place an agent in just the right place at just the right time and if there are any reliable sources who can divulge another country's intentions.

It is not always easy. A suitable candidate must be identified, his friendship and trust nurtured over weeks and months until he is willing to work for us, an opportunity found to insert him in the organization we want to learn about, and enough time allowed him to gain the trust of that organization.

And, then, there may not be anyone who really knows just what will happen next, even in authoritarian countries like the Soviet Union. Many decisions in such countries result from the push and pull of pressure groups — the military, business, the government bureaucracy, or ethnic groups.

Often the best way to forecast what's going to happen is to sense the opinions of such groups. Even in the Soviet Union, opinion could be sampled by traveling, by reading provincial as well as national newspapers, and by taking advantage of opportunities for contacts with citizens. What would be most valuable is a sampling, made over a period of years, to detect changes in various segments of opinion.

In modern espionage, then, spy people need the polling skills of a George Gallup as well as the seductive ones of a Mata Hari.

This is not to suggest that sampling opinion and detecting societal trends replace traditional espionage, but that they proceed side by side with it.

The views of Stansfield Turner, retired admiral and former director of the CIA, are excerpted from his book, Secrecy and Democracy — the CIA in Transition.

BALTIMORE SUN
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Bonn spies' impact described as 'grave'

By Henry Trewhitt
Washington Bureau of The Sun

WASHINGTON — American specialists judged yesterday that the latest spy scandal in West Germany had shattered that country's counterespionage efforts and caused lesser — but still grave — damage to NATO intelligence efforts and those of the United States.

George A. Carver Jr., a former deputy director of central intelligence, said the effect on West Germany's counterspy program would be "enormous." The consequences for intelligence-collecting are mitigated somewhat, he added, by the fragmentation built into the West German system.

Officially, the administration was silent on the unfolding scandal. But a U.S. diplomat, saying his was the prevailing view, called the damage "grave," and said that Hans Joachim Tiedge, a senior West German counterintelligence official who defected to East Germany, "is probably spilling names like a fountain."

In Bonn, the West German government, uncertain how many of its own agents were in jeopardy, was reported to be hastily withdrawing agents from the Soviet bloc. Both there and in Washington, officials said the danger to West German agents may be greater from several secretaries revealed as spies than from Mr. Tiedge.

Stansfield Turner, a former CIA director, concluded that the scandal is "not seriously injurious" to American intelligence directly, because all intelligence services keep the identities of their agents to themselves.

But the "real damage, probably very serious," he said, is to the West German counterespionage system and, by extension, to NATO.

Another former senior intelligence official took a longer view. Apart from "terrible" damage to the West German system, he said, the scandal underscores weaknesses in Western intelligence revealed by recent cases in France, Britain and the United States.

The security breakdown also has implications for efforts to combat terrorism, he said, noting that West Germany's counterespionage agency also must constantly assess the links between terrorists and foreign governments.

The latest scandal began to unfold last week with the disappearance of Sonja Lueneburg, secretary for many years to Martin Bangemann, economics minister and chairman of the Free Democratic Party.

It spread with the defection of Mr. Tiedge. Then other secretaries began to disappear. One in the office of President Richard von Weizsaecker was arrested. Now officials say as many as a dozen women secretaries in sensitive offices are under investigation.

Mr. Carver once was a senior American intelligence officer in West Germany. Against that background, he recalled how the West German system was reorganized after World War II in order to avoid any comparison with the Nazi intelligence network.

That concern led to the separation, in effect, of the oversight and clearance function in counterintelligence from the investigative and arrest function in the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Mr. Tiedge's organization. Mr. Tiedge's appearance in East Berlin is as if a chief of counterintelligence for the FBI had defected.

The Office for the Protection of the Constitution is sharply distinct from the Federal Intelligence Service, and there is a sharp rivalry between the two agencies.

Therefore, Mr. Carver said, Mr. Tiedge "wouldn't have had direct access to U.S. and NATO information — though people do talk to each other. But he was ideally placed to tell the East Germans which of their [agents] were suspected, to warn of raids, and to selectively approve hostile agents for sensitive jobs."

The current scandal and previous ones, Mr. Carver said, may be part of a price West Germany has paid for "deliberate inefficiency" in its intelligence services and laws requiring automatic repatriation of Germans dislocated after World War II.

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Ex-C.I.A. Chief Doubts Soviet Powder Report

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 23 — Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence from 1977 to 1981, today questioned the Reagan Administration assertion that the Soviet Union began in 1976 to track American diplomats' movements with a potentially harmful powder.

Mr. Turner said in an interview that he had never been told of the use of the powder in his years as director. He said in an interview that the Reagan Administration had overstated the number of years the powder had been in use because it was "embarrassed" that it had not acted sooner.

"I think this Administration is being defensive, since they've known about it since 1982 and they didn't do anything until now," he said.

A State Department official said it was plausible that Mr. Turner had not been told of the matter because the technique had not been frequently used. He said the chemical had been detected in and around the American diplomatic buildings and workers fewer than 10 times from 1976 to 1982.

The official said that in the last four months its widespread use has been detected in both Leningrad and Moscow.

'Sporadic and Minuscule'

"Mr. Turner may well have not been aware of its usage, since it was so sporadic and minuscule," he said. "We found it in a lot of places simultaneously beginning this spring."

The official would not specify how many instances had been detected but said it was "orders of magnitude more" than the purported usage from 1976 to 1982.

The United States said Wednesday that it had sent a strong note of protest to the Soviet Union over the chemical, which is called nitrophenylpentadienal, or NPPD. American officials said the substance was a mutagen, a substance that could cause genetic change, and that it therefore might have the potential to cause cancer.

On Thursday, Tass, the Soviet press agency, called the charges "absurd" and a "gross falsehood."

Intelligence officials said such a chemical could be used to keep track of meetings between American officials and Soviet dissidents or others.

Mr. Turner said it was difficult to believe that he would not have been told about the powder.

"If they had known about this at the C.I.A. and didn't tell me, I would be very surprised," he said. "I believe we didn't have any evidence that this was going on in Moscow."

Mr. Turner dismissed suggestions that intelligence officials would have been prepared to overlook a technique that might have been only occasionally used against the embassy.

Malcolm Toon, the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1976 to 1979, said Thursday that he had not been told about the chemical.

Soviet Assails U.S.

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Aug. 23 — The Government newspaper Izvestia today assailed Washington's charges that a potentially harmful tracking agent was being used by the K.G.B.

Under the headline "Dirty and Stupid Provocation," Izvestia said the chemical was in common domestic use, although the article did not name the agent or its uses.

It charged that the accusations made by Washington had been concocted by the Central Intelligence Agency, seeking to cover its own failures and "dirty deeds" in Moscow, and listed the names of diplomats who had been expelled or publicly accused of spying in the press in the past several years.

Izvestia said the State Department had issued a "sensational announcement, fashioned in the genre of science fiction, obviously intended to arouse the public's imagination."